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In this paper, we consider the risk capital framework adopted by
financial institutions. Specifically, we review the recent literature 
on this issue, and clarify the economic assumptions behind this
framework. Based on these observations, we then develop a simple
model for analyzing the economic implications of this framework.
The main implications are as follows. First, risk capital allocations
are theoretically unnecessary without deadweight costs for raising 
capital, which are not usually assumed in the business practices 
of financial institutions. Second, the risk-adjusted rate of return is
redundant as it provides no additional information beyond the net
present value. Third, risk capital allocation is intrinsically difficult
because it is hard to incorporate the correlations among asset returns.
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DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION.I. Introduction
In recent years, an increasing number of financial institutions have adopted risk 
capital frameworks.
1 Under these frameworks, banks determine the amount of capital
needed to cover their risk, and measure their risk-adjusted performance. According to
Zaik et al. (1996), James (1996), and Matten (2000), the elements of the risk capital
frameworks adopted by financial institutions are as follows.
(1) Holding sufficient capital to cover risk
Financial institutions hold a sufficient amount of capital to cover the risk of
their business activities (this capital is called “risk capital”). They determine
the amount of risk capital as the unexpected losses of their operations. They
measure the unexpected losses using value-at-risk and other risk measures. 
(2) Allocating risk capital to each operating division
Financial institutions allocate risk capital to individual lines of business
according to their respective risks.
(3) Evaluating profitability based on risk-adjusted rates of return
Financial institutions evaluate the performance of individual lines of business
using their respective “risk-adjusted rates of return” (profit divided by allocated
risk capital). 
In this paper, we call this framework the “standard framework” of risk capital and
consider its economic implications. We consider this framework as the representative
example of risk capital frameworks, since it is both typical and common to the 
business practices of financial institutions.
2
This standard framework assumes that financial institutions are risk-averse 
decision-makers and make investment decisions based on risk-return trade-offs.
However, finance theory does not assume, a priori, that financial institutions are 
risk-averse decision-makers. Rather, finance theory says that a firm is primarily a
nexus of contracts, and that a firm is risk-neutral in a perfect market (Modigliani and
Miller [1958]). Therefore, to justify the risk capital framework from the theoretical
viewpoint, we must establish the reason why financial institutions are risk-averse.
Since the 1990s, a number of research papers have addressed this issue
3 from the
viewpoint of finance theory. They establish how and why financial institutions 
are risk-averse and propose risk capital frameworks that are well aligned with their
economic analyses.
In this paper, we consider the risk capital framework generally adopted at financial
institutions. Specifically, we review the recent literature and clarify the economic
assumptions behind this framework. Based on these observations, we then develop a
simple model for analyzing the economic implications of this framework.
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1. The “risk capital framework” characterized here is also called “integrated risk management” or the “risk-adjusted
return on capital (RAROC) system.” 
2. There are several variations to this framework. See Zaiket al. (1996), James (1996), and Matten (2000).
3. Froot and Stein (1998) examine the capital of financial institutions, explicitly incorporating the concavity of the
payoff under the existence of economic friction. Merton and Perold (1993) argue that risk capital is viewed as
insurance purchased as required against bankruptcy. Crouhy et al. (1999) define risk capital as the risk-free assets
required to restrain the probability of bankruptcy to within a certain level, and primarily address capital budgeting
decision-making problems.The main findings are as follows.
• The allocation of risk capital is theoretically unnecessary when we do not
assume the deadweight costs of raising capital. As the deadweight costs of raising
capital are not usually assumed in the business practices of financial institutions,
the allocation of risk capital seems unnecessary for practical use.
• The risk-adjusted rate of return in the standard framework is equivalent to the
net present value (NPV). The risk-adjusted rate of return is inferior to the NPV,
since the former requires the calculation of risk capital (i.e., value-at-risk) while
the latter does not. 
• The allocation of risk capital is intrinsically difficult, as we must consider the 
correlations among asset returns.
In the first half of this paper (through Section III), we describe the theories 
presented in the prior research on risk capital. In Section II, we consider a firm’s
financing decision-making in a perfect market. In a perfect market, the Modigliani-
Miller proposition (hereafter the “MM proposition”) holds and risk capital plays no
role in financing decision-making. In Section III, we introduce economic friction
such as bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry. With economic friction, a firm
becomes risk-averse and risk capital plays some roles. We also note that economic
friction is more serious for financial institutions than for nonfinancial firms. Thus,
risk capital plays greater roles at financial institutions than at other firms.
In the second half of this paper (from Section IV onward), we develop a 
simple model for analyzing the standard framework. From this model, we derive 
the economic implications of the risk capital framework in Section IV, and then 
consider the difficulty of risk capital allocation in Section V. Section VI presents 
the conclusions.
II. Financing Decisions in a Perfect Market
In this section, we describe a firm’s
4 capital structure, risk management, and capital
budgeting under a perfect market.
5 This description prepares for the discussions of
risk capital in subsequent sections.
A. The MM Proposition
The MM proposition, stated in Modigliani and Miller (1958), is the most important
factor in considering a firm’s capital structure in a perfect market. Based on the MM
proposition, Fama (1978) demonstrates that in a perfect market that satisfies the 
following conditions, how firms raise funds has no influence on their value.
(1) Frictionless market (there are no transaction costs or taxes, and all assets are
perfectly divisible and marketable).
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4. We make no distinctions between financial institutions and nonfinancial firms in this section, as we only consider
the decision-making in a perfect market. 
5. See Brealey and Myers (2000), McKinsey & Company Inc. et al. (2000), and Damodaran (1999) for firms’
financing decision-making in a perfect market.(2)  Information efficiency (all investors, firms, and firms’ managers have the 
same information, and hold homogeneous expectations regarding how this
information will affect market prices).
(3) Given investment decisions (the investment decisions are given conditions,
and are completely independent from the decisions on raising new external
funds).
(4) Equal access (all market participants can issue securities under the same terms).
The essence of the MM proposition is that a firm’s capital structure does not 
matter, because investors can arrange their own desired payoffs by adjusting their
portfolios by themselves. 
The MM proposition also says that a firm’s risk management does not matter in a
perfect market. A firm has no need to hedge the tradable risks it is exposed to,
because the investors who invest in its stocks or bonds can hedge the firm’s risks by
trading those risks by themselves. So, in a perfect market where the MM proposition
holds, one cannot assume, a priori, that a firm is risk-averse. 
In the following subsections, we explicate the firm’s decision-making in a perfect
market, where the MM proposition holds, using the asset pricing model.
B. Asset Pricing
To examine how risk management and capital structure affect the firm’s value, 
we need to calculate the present value of the firm’s future payoff (hereafter “the 
firm’s value”). In this paper, we adopt the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM
6) to
determine the present value of the future uncertain payoff.
We adopt a two-period model (period 0 and period 1). Under CAPM, equation
(1) shows the relationship between the rate of return ri for a given asset i and the rate
of return for the market portfolio (the market return).
7
E[ri] = rf +  i(E[rM] − rf), (1)
where
8  i = cov(ri, rM)/var(rM), rM is market return, rf is the risk-free rate, and  i is a
constant for each asset.
Here, the random variable Xi indicates the asset’s payoff at period 1, and P(Xi)
indicates the asset’s present value at period 0. By definition of ri,
E[Xi]           1 + E[ri] = —— –. (2)
P(Xi)        
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1), and using   ≡ (E[rM] − rf)/var(rM)
which is not dependent on the characteristics of each asset, the value of P(Xi) is then
determined as shown in equation (3).
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6. The argument in this paper could also be developed using a wider class of pricing models that can be nested in the
stochastic discount factor model. See Cochrane (2001) for the details of the stochastic discount factor.
7. E[•] represents the expectation operator with the given information at period 0.
8. cov(X, Y ) expresses the covariance of the random variables X and Y, and var(X ) expresses the variance of the 
random variable X.E[Xi] −   cov(Xi, rM)  P(Xi) = ———————— –. (3)
1 + rf
C. Capital Budgeting, Capital Structure, and Risk Management 
in a Perfect Market
Next, we explain a firm’s financing decision-making (capital budgeting, capital 
structure, and risk management) in a perfect market, where the MM proposition
holds. In this paper, capital budgeting, capital structure, and risk management 
decision-making are defined as follows.
(1) Capital budgeting
To decide how much to invest in an investment opportunity. 
(2) Capital structure
To select how the investment is financed. For simplicity, we assume that a firm
can finance only with common stocks and straight bonds.
(3) Risk management
To decide whether or not to hedge the tradable risks that a firm is exposed to. 
In this paper, those three decisions are collectively referred to as the firm’s 
“financing decision-making.”
The firm’s NPV is expressed by equation (4), where P(X ) represents the firm’s
present value and I represents the amount of capital.
NPV = P(X ) − I. (4)
One of the most important characteristics of a firm’s financing decision-making in
a perfect market is “value additivity.”
9 The concept of value additivity is as follows.
Suppose there are two investment opportunities A and B with payoffs XA and XB,
respectively, and their present values are P(XA) and P(XB). Value additivity holds
when the sum of these present values is the same as the present value of the two
investment opportunities taken together, that is, where P(XA + XB) = P(XA) + P(XB).
From equation (3), value additivity holds when the following holds.
E[XA + XB] −   cov(XA + XB, rM)        P(XA + XB) = ————————————– 
1 + rf
E[XA] −   cov(XA,rM)    E[XB] −   cov(XB,rM)   = ————————– + ————————–    
1 + rf 1 + rf
= P(XA) + P(XB). (5) 
Value additivity results from the linearity of the present value P(X ) to the payoff X.
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9. See Brealey and Myers (2000) for a detailed introduction to value additivity.Additionally, because IA+B = IA + IB, the NPV is also value additive as shown in
equation (6).
NPVA + NPVB = {P(XA) − IA} + {P(XB) − IB} 
= {P(XA) + P(XB)} − {IA + IB} 
= P(XA + XB) − {IA + IB} 
= NPVA+B. (6)
This value additivity has the following important implications for the firm’s
financing decision-making.
(1) Capital budgeting
The capital budgeting decisions on multiple investment opportunities are
independent of each other when value additivity holds. As is clear from 
equation (6),
10 the NPV of one investment opportunity is independent of the
NPV of another investment opportunity. For example, suppose that a firm has
two operating divisions, and they both implement capital budgeting. If each
division independently maximizes its NPV without any consideration for the
other, the NPV of the firm will also be maximized.
(2) Capital structure
Value additivity is equivalent to the MM proposition that capital structure
does not matter. This can be shown as follows.
11 Let a random variable X
indicate a firm’s payoff at period 1. When the firm’s only means of fund-
raising is the issuance of stocks, the firm’s value becomes P1 = P(X ). Next,
consider the firm’s value when the firm can raise funds by issuing stocks
and/or bonds. When the stock and bond payoffs at period 1 are S and D,
respectively, the firm’s present value P2 is the sum of those of the stocks and
bonds, so P2 = P(S) + P(D). As the firm’s overall payoff at period 1 can be
divided into those of stocks and bonds, X = S + D. Because of the value 
additivity, it can then be demonstrated that P1 = P2, as in equation (7).
P1 = P(X ) = P(S +D) = P(S) + P(D) = P2. (7)
(3) Risk management
Value additivity is equivalent to the irrelevance of risk management.
12 This 
can be shown by the following example. Let a random variable X indicate a
firm’s payoff at period 1. Suppose that the variability of the firm’s payoff X can
all be hedged by market trading, specifically by a forward contract of the 
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10. Rather than utilizing equation (3), practitioners commonly calculate the present value using a modified version 
of equation (2): P(Xi) = E(Xi)/(1 + ri). In this case, although it is necessary to calculate the value of ri (or  i) 
for each investment opportunity, a single value is often adopted for an entire firm. If the individual investment
opportunity’s   were always equal to (or nearly equal to) the firm’s  , this would not present many problems. Since
this is not the case, the use of the P(Xi) = E(Xi)/(1+ ri) equation is generally inappropriate, as detailed below.
11. See Ross (1978) for this proof of the MM proposition.
12. See Culp (2001) for a more detailed explanation.payoff’s underlying assets. In a perfect market, the NPV of the forward 
contract (F – X, where the forward delivery price is F ) is zero.
13 In other
words, equation (3) can be restated as follows.
E[F − X ] −   cov(F − X, rM)    0 = ——————————— —. (8)
1 + rf
Thus, the forward delivery price F can be expressed as follows.
14
F = E[X ] −   cov(X, rM). (9)
Here, after the risk on the payoff X is hedged and the payoff becomes the 
forward delivery price F, the firm’s value after the hedge P′ 1 becomes identical
to the firm’s value before the hedge P(X).
E[F] −   cov(F, rM)       FE [X ] −   cov(X, rM) P′ 1 = P(F ) = ——————— — = ——– = ———————— 
1 + rf 1 + rf 1 + rf
= P(X ). (10)
Therefore, because of the value additivity, the firm’s hedge operation does not
change its value. Thus, risk management is irrelevant when value additivity
holds.
III. Financing Decisions in a Real Market
A. Existence of Economic Friction
In the previous section, we assumed a perfect market. In a perfect market, value addi-
tivity holds and capital structure and risk management are irrelevant. As shown in the
previous section, value additivity is based on the linear relationship between the NPV
and the payoff. Thus, the irrelevance of capital structure and risk management
depends on this linear relationship.
In the real world, the firm’s NPV may not be a linear function of the payoff. 
This is usually due to the existence of “economic friction”
15 such as bankruptcy costs
and progressive corporate tax rates. This friction places costs on the firm that have a
convex function with the payoff.
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13. In a perfect market, the NPV of market trading is always zero. This can be explained as follows. Assume a given
trading opportunity with a positive NPV in a perfect market. Because all the participants can freely engage in 
trading, they would all take advantage of this trading opportunity. This would result in a surplus demand for 
this trading opportunity, so the market price would then move downward, reducing the NPV. This market price
adjustment would continue until the NPV declines to zero, and reach equilibrium when the NPV equals zero. 
In a perfect market, this price adjustment would be done instantaneously. Thus, market trading with a positive
NPV cannot exist in a perfect market.
14. From equation (3), E[X] = (1 + rf)P(X ) +   cov(X , rM), so F = (1 + rf)P(X ). This is the forward delivery price
derived from the non-arbitrage conditions whereby there are no risk-free profits.
15. Although the agency problem is also an important reason for the imperfection of financial markets, it is not
addressed in this paper. See Barnea et al. (1985) for the details of the agency problem.When the payoff before considering the costs of economic friction is X and the
payoff after considering the costs isV(X ), there is a concave function betweenV(X )
and X, as shown in Figure 1. The firm’s NPV is no longer linear with its payoff, and
the MM proposition and value additivity no longer hold.
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Figure 1  Relation between Costs from Economic Friction and Payoff
Payoff prior to considering economic friction costs: X
[1] Costs from Economic Friction
Payoff prior to considering economic friction costs: X
[2] Payoff after Considering Economic Friction Costs: V(X)
Payoff in a complete market 
(linear function V(X) = X )
Payoff considering economic 
friction costs
The following three costs have been noted as types of economic friction that affect
the linearity of NPVs (Smith and Stulz [1985] and Froot et al. [1993]).
(1) Corporate taxes 
If effective marginal tax rates on a firm are progressive, or an increasing 
function of the firm’s pretax value, the after-tax value of the firm is a concave
function of its pretax value. (2) Bankruptcy costs
A firm must pay bankruptcy costs,
16 such as legal and administrative costs,
when the firm’s value is below its debt level. Thus, the bankruptcy costs are
high when the firm’s value is low. This results in a concavity between the 
payoff before the bankruptcy costs and the payoff after the bankruptcy costs. 
(3) Higher cost of raising external capital
Due to agency and information problems, new external capital is more 
expensive than internal capital. Froot et al. (1993) demonstrate that the payoff
function becomes increasingly convex from raising external capital. They state
that declines in the firm’s payoff deplete internal reserves, and then lead to a
higher level of dependence on external capital. When external capital is more
expensive than internal capital, this growing dependence on external capital
imposes a higher cost on the firm. 
B. Payoff Concavity and Value Non-Additivity
We explained how the costs of economic friction result in a concave function
between the payoffs before the costs are considered and the payoffs after the costs 
are considered.
We now demonstrate that the firm’s value is not value additive when the payoff
function is concave. Suppose the firm’s payoff before considering the costs of 
economic friction is X and the payoff after considering the costs isV. Also supposeV
is a concave function of X, as follows.
V = V(X),   where V′(•) > 0, V″(•) < 0. (11)
Using equation (3), the firm’s value can now be expressed as equation (12).
E[V(X )] −   cov(V(X ), rM) P(V(X)) = —————————— —. (12)
1 + rf
Since V(•) is a concave function, as shown in equation (13), there is no value
additivity.
E[V(XA + XB)] −   cov(V(XA + XB), rM)      
P(V(XA + XB)) = ———————————————   
1 + rf
E[V(XA)] −   cov(V(XA), rM)    E[V(XB)] −   cov(V(XB), rM)
≠ ——————————— + ——————————— 
1 + rf 1 + rf
= P(V(XA)) + P(V(XB)). (13) 
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16. There are two types of bankruptcy costs: direct and indirect. The direct costs of bankruptcy are the costs of 
processing bankruptcy procedures such as legal and administrative costs. The indirect costs of bankruptcy include
the costs of deterioration of the firm’s business from the bankruptcy procedure. See Brealey and Myers (2000) for
details of bankruptcy costs.Because there is no value additivity, the conclusions reached for the firm’s 
financing decision-making in a perfect market no longer hold. In other words, the
firm’s financing decision-making in a real market is far more complex compared with
that in a perfect market.
C. Economic Friction at Financial Institutions
Thus far, we have made no distinction between financial institutions and non-
financial firms. However, economic friction has a greater influence on the former 
than the latter. Merton and Perold (1993) note that bankruptcy costs and information
costs are more remarkable at financial institutions than at nonfinancial firms.
(1) Bankruptcy costs
The major customers of financial institutions can be major liability holders;
for example, policyholders, depositors, and swap counterparties are all 
liability holders as well as customers. When the bankruptcy risk at a financial
institution rises, customers typically move to other financial institutions. 
This exodus of customers imposes another indirect cost on the struggling
financial institution, because it loses the profits that would otherwise have
been derived.
An exodus of customers may also occur at nonfinancial firms, but the
impact is far greater at financial institutions because their customers, especially
those who are outside of the deposit insurance safety net, are extremely sensitive
to bankruptcy risk. Thus, the bankruptcy costs at financial institutions
17 are far
greater than those at nonfinancial firms.
(2) Information costs
In general, financial institutions do not disclose their assets or activities in
great detail, and thus their business appears opaque to customers and
investors.
18 That is, the detailed asset holdings and business activities of the
firm are not publicly disclosed (or, if disclosed, only with a considerable lag in
time). Furthermore, principal financial firms typically have relatively liquid
balance sheets that, in the course of just weeks, can and often do undergo 
substantial changes in size and risk. The information asymmetry between the
management of financial institutions and outsiders leads to the problem of
higher costs of raising external capital (Myers and Majluf [1984]). As a result,
the problem of higher costs of raising external capital is more serious at 
financial institutions than at nonfinancial firms.
Froot and Stein (1998) develop a framework for analyzing the capital allocation
and capital structure decisions of financial institutions incorporating economic 
friction. In their framework, they propose a two-factor model that can be used for
capital budgeting problems at financial institutions. With the model, they clarify the
roles of economic friction on the financing decision-making of financial institutions. 
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17. See Merton (1997) for a discussion of the scale of bankruptcy costs at financial institutions.
18. The “opaqueness” of financial institutions is first noted in Ross (1989).However, the framework of Froot and Stein (1998) is not widely adopted in the
practices of financial institutions. As they note, their framework requires calculation
of the concavity of the payoff function (V(•) in equation [11]), which is hard to 
measure in practice. Instead, financial institutions adopt risk capital frameworks,
which are not consistent with the framework of Froot and Stein (1998).
IV. Standard Framework
In this section, we analyze the risk capital frameworks adopted by financial 
institutions. As noted in Section I, we use the “standard framework” as a generalized
example of the risk capital frameworks. The elements of the standard framework are
as follows.
(1) Holding sufficient capital to cover risk
Financial institutions hold a sufficient amount of capital to cover the 
risk of their business activities (this capital is called “risk capital”). They 
determine the amount of risk capital as the unexpected losses of their 
operations. They measure the unexpected losses using value-at-risk and other
risk measures. 
(2) Allocating risk capital to each operating division
Financial institutions allocate risk capital to individual lines of business
according to their respective risks.
(3) Evaluating profitability based on risk-adjusted rates of return
Financial institutions evaluate the performance of individual lines of business
using their respective “risk-adjusted rates of return” (profit divided by allocated
risk capital). 
In this section, we first demonstrate how the standard framework can be 
developed into a model (hereafter, the “standard model”) by positing assumptions
that simplify the firm’s payoff. We then examine the economic implications of the
standard framework of risk capital adopted by financial institutions. 
Also, we limit our considerations of the standard framework in this section to 
elements (1) “holding sufficient capital to cover risk” and (3) “evaluating profitability
based on risk-adjusted rates of return.” We proceed with considerations of element
(2) “allocating risk capital to each operating division” in the subsequent section. 
A. Basic Concept of the Standard Framework
The basic concept of the standard framework is “holding sufficient capital to cover
risk.” More precisely, the risk is quantified using value-at-risk or other risk measures
and capital equal to or greater than the calculated risk is held as a buffer against it.
B. Standard Model
We develop the standard model based on the setup presented by Froot and Stein
(1998), as follows. The model has two time periods, period 0 and period 1. We
assume that a financial institution invests in an investment opportunity that will 
generate a per unit payoff of X at period 1. At period 0, X is a random variable with a
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We also assume that this investment opportunity is available for an infinite number
of units and that the investment can be implemented without cost.
Meanwhile, this financial institution raises an amount of capital K at period 0,
and invests the proceeds in a risk-free asset. The following discussions through
Section IV.E all assume that this amount of capital K is exogenously given.
The financial institution makes an investment of   units in the investment
opportunity. Now, we introduce the standard framework whereby the institution
retains sufficient capital to cover the risk. In this paper, we assume the linear 
homogeneity presented in equation (14) for the amount of risk  (•).
 ( X ) =   (X ). (14)
The financing decision-making of the institution takes place under the restrictions
expressed by equation (15).
 ( X ) ≤ K. (15)
Equation (15) may be viewed as a function expressing the financial institution’s
“behavioral principle” under the standard framework of risk capital whereby the 
risk may not exceed the risk capital. We assume that the payoff for this financial 
institution is as expressed in equations (16) and (17).
V(w) = w,   when  ( X ) ≤ K. (16)
w =  X + (1 + rf)K. (17)
Equation (16) says that economic friction is nonexistent as long as the 
capital covers the risk of the financial institution. This is the basic principle of the 
standard framework.
19 Given the linear homogeneity, equation (15) can be rewritten 
as follows.
K   ≤ —— –. (18)
 (X )       
The institution’s NPV can now be expressed as follows based on equations (16)
and (17).
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19. Some may argue that the standard framework of risk capital assumes a convex function for a firm’s value. If we
assume a convex function, however, the firm’s financing decision-making would be the same as that in Froot and
Stein (1998), which is not widely adopted by financial institutions.E[w] −   cov(w, rM)  NPV = P(V(w)) − K = P(w) − K = ———————— −K
1 + rf
E[ X + (1 + rf)K ] −   cov( X + (1 + rf)K, rM)  
= —————————————————— — − K
1 + rf
 E[X] + (1 + rf)K −    cov(X, rM) 
= —————————————— − K
1 + rf
E[X] −   cov(X, rM)  
=   ———————— =  P(X ). (19)
1 + rf
As long as the inequality of equation (15) holds, the NPV has nothing to do with
the capital K, and is equal to the present value of the investment in   units. Thus,
the financial institution’s NPV has value additivity.
C. Capital Budgeting under a Single Investment Opportunity
Under the standard model, the capital budgeting is very simple. When the institution
is holding capital K, the objective is to maximize the NPV as calculated by equation
(19) under the restrictions imposed by equation (15). This can be expressed as 
equation (20).
max P(X),   subject to    ≤ K/ (X ). (20)
 
The solution to this maximization problem is clearly   = K/ (X), so the maximized
NPV becomes NPV = KP(X )/ (X).
Moreover, the decision on whether or not to invest in any given investment
opportunity is simply determined by whether or not its NPV is positive. In other
words, as long as P(X) > 0, the investment will increase the financial institution’s
NPV (see equation [19]) and should therefore be implemented. Meanwhile the
investment amount   is determined by equation (18).
The expression P(X ) > 0 can be reformulated into the following expression.
cov(X , rM)    P(X ) > 0 ⇔ E[X] > ———— –(E[rM] − rf), (21)
var(rM) 
(Multiplying both sides by  /K and adding rf)
E[w] − K ⇔ ———— > rf +  CAPM, X/K(E[rM] − rf), (22)
K
where  CAPM, X/K = cov( X/K, rM)/var(rM).
The left-hand side of equation (22) now expresses the expected rate of return 
on the capital K, and the right-hand side expresses the shareholders’ expected rate 
of return calculated using the CAPM. Thus, equation (22) is an expression of the
risk-adjusted rates of return approach often adopted by financial institutions. The
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shows that this standard model well describes the standard risk capital framework of
financial institutions.
However, notably, the capital budgeting determined by equation (22) is not
dependent on the capital K. This is because equation (22) is equivalent to equation
(21), which is not dependent on the capital K. It indicates that an investment should
be made whenever the NPV of the investment opportunity is positive. Therefore, 
the risk-adjusted rate of return derived from equation (22), which is widely used for
capital budgeting, provides no additional information to the capital budgeting based
solely on present value. 
D. Risk Management
The influence of risk management on a firm’s value can also easily be analyzed.
From the conclusions of Section IV.C, the maximized NPV of the financial 
institution can be expressed as follows.
KP(X )  NPV = —— —. (23)
 (X ) 
Let us examine how hedge trading with zero NPV influences the value of 
equation (23). To begin with, when we assume trading with zero NPV to ensure
value additivity for the present value of investment opportunities, this does not affect
the numerator of equation (23). On the other hand, such hedge trading decreases the
denominator  (X ). Therefore, it is optimal to completely hedge all tradable risks.
E. Capital Budgeting under Multiple Investment Opportunities
Next, we consider the case when a financial institution has already invested in a given
investment opportunity, and now has to consider its capital budgeting for another
investment opportunity.
We assume that the financial institution has already made a one-unit investment
in the prior investment opportunity without cost, and define XP as a random variable
expressing its payoff. Similarly, we assume that the new investment opportunity can
also be made without cost, and define XN as a random variable expressing its payoff.
If the amount of investment in the new investment opportunity is  , the payoff
that will be gained at period 1 is expressed as follows.
w = XP +  XN + (1 + rf)K. (24)
In this case, the financial institution’s NPV is expressed as equation (25).
96 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2003E[w] −   cov(w, rM)  NPV = P(w) − K = ——————— — − K
1 + rf
E[XP +  XN + (1 + rf)K ] −   cov(XP +  XN + (1 + rf)K, rM)
= —————————————————— ————— — − K
1 + rf
E[XP] +  E[XN] + (1 + rf)K −   cov(XP, rM)−    cov(XN, rM)
= —————————————————— —————— − K
1 + rf
E[XP] −   cov(XP, rM) E[XN] −   cov(XN, rM)
= ————————– +   ———————— —
1 + rf 1 + rf
= P(XP) +  P(XN). (25)
This demonstrates that the financial institution’s NPV equals the sum of the 
present values of the two investment opportunities. The constraint condition is
expressed in equation (26).
 (XP +  XN) ≤ K. (26)
Therefore, the maximization problem is
max[P(XP) +  P(XN)],   subject to    (XP +  XN) ≤ K. (27)
 
Although equation (27) is simple, it is not easily solved because the constraint is
nonlinear in general.
As a calculation example, we assume that the risk is proportional to the standard
deviation of the payoff. That is to say, we assume  (X )  =   (X ) (where   is 
a constant).
In this case, we arrive at the following expression.
max[P(XP) +  P(XN)],   subject to    (XP +  XN) ≤ K. (28)
 





2 −  
2(XP)) 
2(XN) − cov(XN, XP)    ≤   = ————————————————————— –. (29)
 
2(XN)
In other words, the optimal solution that maximizes the NPV is   =   –.
As demonstrated by this example, the amount of investment in the new investment
opportunity is determined depending on the correlation cov(XN, XP).
Just as under the case with a single investment opportunity, when there are 
multiple investment opportunities, it is still optimal to make all investments that
have positive NPV. It can be shown that estimating risk-adjusted rates of return does
not provide any additional information for capital budgeting. We show this below in
Section V.
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For practitioners, the capital is exogenously given. Theoretically, however, the amount
of capital K should be determined so that it maximizes the financial institutions’ NPV. 
Section IV.C demonstrated that when there is only one investment opportunity
and the capital K is given, the maximized NPV becomes KP(X )/ (X ). Because this
is proportional to K, the optimal amount of capital is infinite, that is, K =  .
However, this conclusion that the optimal amount of capital is limitless is 
based on an implicit assumption that there are an infinite number of investment
opportunities with positive NPV. As this assumption is unrealistic, now we 
assume that the investment opportunities that have a positive NPV are limited. 
In this case, the financial institution should retain just enough capital to take 
advantage of these limited investment opportunities. In other words, we arrive at
the following equation.
K =  ( X ). (30) 
V. Capital Allocation
In this section, we consider the capital allocation. To do so, we apply the standard
model to financial institutions with multiple operating divisions.
20
A. Rationale of Capital Allocations
Here the rationale to allocating capital to different operating divisions is examined in
light of the standard framework.
1. The standard framework
As explained in Section IV, in the standard framework, a financial institution’s payoff
is presented in equation (17) as long as the institution holds risk capital that is 
greater than the risk. Here we assume that capital of Ki is allocated to each operating
division i. Each operating division invests this capital in risk-free assets and, at the
same time, costlessly invests in an investment opportunity that generates a payoff of
Xi per unit at period 1. Following the same approach as that adopted for equation
(17), assuming that each division invests in one unit of the investment opportunity,
the payoff at each operating division then becomes as shown in equation (31).
wi = Xi + (1 + rf)Ki. (31)
The NPV of each operating division can then be expressed as follows.
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20. Zaik et al. (1996) and Culp (2001) introduce specific capital allocation methods that practitioners actually utilize.NPVi = P(wi) − Ki
E[Xi + (1 + rf)Ki] −   cov(Xi + (1 + rf)Ki, rM)  
= —————————————————— − Ki 1 + rf
E[Xi] −   cov(Xi, rM)  
= ———————— – = P(Xi). (32)
1 + rf
While equation (32) shows the NPV of each operating division, this equation
does not include the capital Ki. Moreover, this NPV is equal to the present value of
the investment, and is not influenced by the capital allocation or by the investments
made by other operating divisions.
Following the same approach adopted in Section IV.C, equation (32) can 
be restated to express the risk-adjusted rate of return for each operating division i
as follows.
E[Xi] −   cov(Xi, rM)  NPVi = ———————— – > 0
1 + rf
E[wi] − Ki ⇔ ——— —– > rf +  CAPM, Xi/Ki(E[rM] − rf), (33)
Ki
where wi = Xi + (1 + rf)Ki and Ki > 0.
While equation (33) shows the capital budgeting based on the risk-adjusted rate
of return, it has the same value as the capital budgeting based on NPV, and thus 
the amount of capital Ki allocated to each operating division i has absolutely no
influence on the results. Therefore, just as in Section IV.C, this demonstrates that 
calculating the risk-adjusted rate of return provides no additional information.
For practical use, it is necessary to calculate  CAPM, Xi/Ki for each investment oppor-
tunity, but in actual practice it seems that financial institutions use a fixed value of  ,
regardless of the investment opportunity (Zaik et al. [1996]). This would not present
many problems if the individual investment opportunity’s   were always equal to 
(or nearly equal to) the firm’s  . Since this is not the case, the use of a fixed value is
generally inappropriate.
21
Furthermore, as shown in the following equation, the sum of the NPVs of each
operating division is equal to the NPV of the financial institution.
nn E[Xi] −   cov(Xi, rM)  NPVi = ———————— – 





= —— – (E   Xi −   cov( Xi, rM)) = NPVT. (34)
1 + rf i=1  i =1
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21. When an oil refining company makes an investment to expand its existing facilities, using the firm’s   for this
new investment may be appropriate. However, if this same firm decides to advance into the convenience store
business, using the firm’s   to evaluate this convenience store investment is certainly inappropriate.Here, the term NPVT represents the total NPV of the financial institution. This 
equation holds regardless of the methodology adopted to determine the capital 
allocation to each division. 
Our conclusions regarding the standard framework can be summarized as follows.
First, for capital budgeting, the capital allocation to each operating division should be
based on equation (32), which shows the NPV of each division. Because equation
(32) is not influenced by other investment opportunities, the capital budgeting works
for the individual operating divisions are independent of one other. Additionally, 
the sum of the NPVs of each division is equal to the total NPV of the financial 
institution, that is to say, it has value additivity. Thus, as long as each operating 
division maximizes its own NPV, the financial institution’s NPV will automatically
be maximized.
The next conclusion is that the level of capital should be determined centrally at
headquarters. The headquarters should monitor the risks at all operating divisions,
and raise sufficient capital to cover all of these risks. The capital allocation does not
matter, since how capital is allocated does not affect equation (34), which ensures
that the NPV maximization at individual divisions leads automatically to the NPV
maximization of the entire financial institution.
2. Introduction of deadweight costs
Section V.A.1 concluded that all positive-NPV investment should be implemented. It
also concluded that capital allocations are irrelevant. However, the discussion in
Section V.A.1 assumes that financial institutions are able to raise an infinite amount
of capital without any cost. We now expand the argument to encompass a world in
which holding capital incurs deadweight costs.
22 We then show how the existence of
deadweight costs may provide the basis for the capital allocations that are actually
implemented by financial institutions. 
The basic model parameters are the same as those in Section V.A.1. Here the
deadweight cost of holding an amount of capital K is given by  K. In this case, the
payoff of each operating division becomes as follows.
wi = Xi + (1 + rf −  )Ki. (35)
The NPV can now be expressed as in equation (36).
23
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22. This deadweight cost is completely different from the cost of capital, which is the shareholders’ expected rate of
return. While the cost of capital exists even in a perfect market, deadweight costs are caused by economic friction,
and do not exist in a perfect market. 
23. Following the same approach adopted in Section IV.C, equation (36) can be rewritten to express the risk-adjusted
rate of return for operating divisioni as follows.
E[Xi] −   cov(Xi, rM)         NPVi = ————————– − —— –Ki > 0
1 + rf 1 + rf
E[wi] − Ki ⇔ ————– > rf +  CAPM, Xi/Ki(E[rM] − rf)( *)
Ki
where wi = Xi + (1 + rf −  )Ki,    Ki > 0. 
The capital budgeting under the risk-adjusted rate of return from equation (*) is the same as that based on 
the NPV.E[Xi] −   cov(Xi, rM)          NPVi = P(wi) − Ki = ———————— – − ——–Ki. (36)
1 + rf 1 + rf
Unlike the NPV in equation (32), the NPV of each operating division in 
equation (36) depends on the capital Ki. This is because costs are incurred in 
holding this capital, which becomes necessary when risks are taken by implementing
investments. Such deadweight costs must be borne by financial institutions, and the
institutions must also devise some sort of rules for the allocation of capital to the
individual operating divisions. In other words, once deadweight costs are introduced,
capital allocation becomes necessary. This means the financial institutions themselves
have implicitly assumed the existence of deadweight costs as the basis for their 
capital allocations. 
B. Methodologies for Capital Allocation
We now consider specific methodologies for capital allocation, which presumes the
existence of deadweight costs. First we introduce the approach to capital allocation in
Merton and Perold (1993), which focuses on the additional risk capital required for
implementing investments. We then point out the problems with this approach, and
explain the intrinsic difficulty of determining an appropriate allocation method. 
1. Capital allocation under Merton and Perold (1993)
In Merton and Perold (1993), “marginal risk capital” is obtained by calculating the
risk capital required for the firm without a new business and subtracting it from the
risk capital required for the full portfolio of businesses. They claim that management
decisions on whether or not to invest into a new business must be based on the cost
of marginal risk capital. This argument can be expressed using the standard model
developed in the previous section as follows.
Assume that a financial institution has n operating divisions, and that the total
NPV of the institution excluding a new operating division s is NPVT
s. In this case,
NPVT and NPVT
s may be calculated as shown in equations (37) and (38), respectively. 






E  Xi −   cov( Xi, rM) i =1  i =1   = ——————————– − —— – (XT), (37)
1 + rf 1 + rf
E[wT − ws] −   cov(wT − ws, rM)  NPVT






E  Xi − X s −   cov( Xi − Xs, rM) i=1  i =1   = ——————————————– − —— – (XT − X s). (38)
1 + rf 1 + rf
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risk measure. 
The differential between NPVT and NPVT
s is shown by equation (39).
NPVT − NPVT
s
E[Xs] −   cov(Xs, rM)         = ———————— – − —— –( (XT) −  (XT − Xs)). (39)
1 + rf 1 + rf
So equation (39) shows the difference in the financial institution’s NPV with and
without operating division s, and can therefore be used to determine whether or 
not the institution should invest in this new business s. As long as the solution to
equation (39) is positive, operating division s contributes to increasing the financial
institution’s total NPV.
Now if the capital allocation rule is defined by equation (40), the NPV calculated
using equation (39) becomes equal to the NPV calculated using equation (36), which
is the standard for capital budgeting among divisions when deadweight costs exist. 
Ki =  (XT) −  (XT − Xi). (40) 
The capital allocation rule stated by equation (40) may be viewed as indicating
that when a new operating division is added to a financial institution, the risk capital
that should be allocated to this new division should equal the increase in the total
risk resulting from it. This means that implementing capital budgeting based on the
marginal risk capital can also be used to measure the extent to which each division
contributes to the financial institution’s total NPV. 
2. Intrinsic difficulty of appropriate capital allocation 
Conversely, after risk capital is allocated to each operating division by the rule
expressed by equation (40), can equation (36) then be used to evaluate the relative
contributions of each of the divisions to the financial institution’s total NPV?
Unfortunately, this is generally impossible under equation (40). This is because risk
measures normally have a risk diversification effect (i.e.,  (Xi + Xj) ≤  (Xi) +  (Xj)),
and thus under this allocation rule the sum of the risk capital allocated to each 
operating division does not equal KT. 
nn
 Ki = ( (XT) −  (XT − Xi))                 
i =1 i =1
≠  (XT) = KT. (41)
In this case, value additivity does not hold for the sum of the NPVs of the individual
operating divisions and the financial institution’s total NPV. So, for example, even 
if the NPVs of the individual divisions are all positive, this does not necessarily 
guarantee that the institution’s total NPV will be positive. 
This can be explained as follows. From equation (39), the sum of the NPVs of the
individual divisions can be calculated using equation (42). 
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E  X s −   cov( Xs, rM) s=1  s=1  
n
= —————————— — − —— – ( (XT) −  (XT − X s)). (42)
1 + rf 1 + rf s=1




s) depends on the relative magnitude of  (XT) and  
n
s=1( (XT) −
 (XT − Xs)).
When n = 2,
2
 ( (XT) −  (XT − Xs)) 
s=1
=  (XT) +  (XT) −  (XT − X 1) −  (XT − X2) 
=  (XT) +  (XT) −  (X2) −  (X1) 
≤  (XT).  (   (XT) ≤  (X 1) +  (X2)) (43)
Thus, when n = 2, if the NPV of each individual division is positive, the financial
institution’s total NPV is not necessarily positive.
When n = 3, 
3
 ( (XT) −  (XT − Xs)) 
s=1
= 3 (XT) −  (XT − X 1) −  (XT − X2) −  (XT − X3) 
= 3 (XT) −  (X 2 + X3) −  (X 1 + X 3) −  (X1 + X 2)
≥ 3 (XT) − 2( (X 1) +  (X2) +  (X 3)), (44)
and at the same time,
3 (XT) − 2( (X1) +  (X2) +  (X 3))
≤  (XT).  (   (XT) ≤  (X 1) +  (X2) +  (X 3))   (45)
Thus, when n = 3, no a priori conclusions can be reached regarding the relative 
magnitude of  (XT) and  
3
s=1( (XT) −  (XT − Xs)).
These two cases (n = 2, 3) are sufficient to demonstrate that even when the NPVs
of the individual operating divisions calculated using equation (36) are all positive
(negative), this does not necessarily guarantee that the institution’s total NPV will be
positive (negative). 
In other words, even though equation (39) can serve as a capital budgeting 
standard to determine the risk capital that should be allocated to any given division,
this equation cannot be used to compare the relative NPV contributions of all the
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whereby   (XT)  = KT must be based on some principle other than the level of 
contribution to the firm’s value.
From this perspective, Denault (2001) proposes “fairness” as one principle for 
the allocation of capital. He utilizes game theory to demonstrate that a “fair” capital
allocation methodology exists that fulfills the condition  (XT) = KT. 
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we first considered the risk capital framework generally adopted by
financial institutions. We noted that risk capital allocations are theoretically irrelevant
under this framework. However, when deadweight costs are introduced for raising
capital, risk capital allocations become relevant. We then argued that the risk-
adjusted rate of return is theoretically unnecessary for evaluating the profitability of
investment opportunities, as it provides no additional information beyond simple
NPV calculations. Finally, we pointed out the intrinsic difficulty of capital allocation
because of the risk diversification effect.
However, it is important to note that we have set aside several important issues 
in developing the model in this paper. The most important of these issues are 
summarized below, and we would like to leave these as topics for future research.
(1) Agency problem
At financial institutions, an agency problem
24 exists between corporate 
management (at headquarters) and the individual operating divisions. In 
general, the individual operating divisions have more detailed information
regarding the investment opportunities available to them, compared with the
information available to corporate management. If the objectives of the oper-
ating divisions diverge from those of corporate management, the operating
divisions may take advantage of their superior information to maximize their
own interests.
25
(2) Appropriateness of the assumptions regarding economic friction
Although it is difficult to actually measure economic friction, the issue of how
economic friction influences the payoff of financial institutions needs to be
further considered.
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24. For the details of this type of in-house agency problem, see, for example, Brealey and Myers (2000) and 
Stein (2001).
25. See Krishnan (2000) and Stoughton and Zechner (1999).105
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